PERSONALIZED SMART GUNS: A FUTURISTIC
DREAM OR A PRAGMATIC SOLUTION?
ANDRES PACIUC

INTRODUCTION
After horrific mass shootings such as those that occurred in Sandy
Hook, Las Vegas, and Orlando, both sides of the political aisle
immediately debate heated topics like banning assault weapons and high
capacity magazines.1 This Note, however, will focus on a largely ignored
alternative to the predictable and oftentimes unproductive back and forth
that is endemic to the national gun debate. Personalized smart guns—
firearms equipped with safety technology allowing only authorized users
to fire them2—represent a novel, useful, and constitutional intervention in
the gun debate.
This Note will explore the constitutional and practical viability of
a smart gun mandate as a means to reduce certain kinds of firearm-related
deaths such as those caused by suicide and accidental firearm discharges.
While other legal articles have been written about smart guns,3 this Note
distinguishes itself from prior literature by extensively delving into the
empirical data regarding both the firearm-related deaths that could be
prevented by smart guns and the likelihood that a smart gun mandate
would pass constitutional muster. Part I will provide background on
Second Amendment legal doctrine. Part II will explore the smart gun
technology itself, covering the main types of personalized smart guns to
1

See, e.g., Jonathan Weisman, Senate Blocks Drive for Gun Control, N.Y. TIMES
(Apr. 17, 2013), https://www.nytimes.com/2013/04/18/us/politics/senate-obamagun-control.html (stating that a ban on assault weapons and high capacity
magazines failed to pass in the Senate in 2013); Dorottya Demszky et al.,
Analyzing Polarization in Social Media: Method and Application to Tweets on 21
Mass Shootings, ARXIV (Apr. 4, 2019), https://arxiv.org/pdf/1904.01596.pdf
(identifying polarization in Democrats and Republicans’ responses to mass
shootings).
2
GIFFORDS LAW CTR. TO PREVENT GUN VIOLENCE, SECURING A SAFER FUTURE
8 (2018), https://giffords.org/wp-content/uploads/2018/06/Securing-a-SaferFuture-Giffords-Law-Center-6.13.18.pdf.
3
See, e.g., Drury D. Stevenson, Smart Guns, the Law, and the Second
Amendment, 124 PENN ST. L. REV. 691 (2020); Jessica M. Lujan, HalfCocked:“Smart Gun” Mandates Are Premature And Unconstitutional Under The
Prevailing “Undue Burden” Test, 24 B.U. J. SCI. & TECH. L. 500 (2018),
https://www.bu.edu/jostl/files/2018/10/Lujan-—-FINAL.pdf; Tyler J. Kimberly,
A Higher Caliber of Regulation: Is Making Smart-Gun Technology Mandatory
Constitutionally Permissible?, 65 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 251 (2014).
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later highlight how the reliability of the technology plays into the
constitutional viability of a smart gun mandate. Part III will then assess
whether smart guns are effective in mitigating firearm-related deaths. Part
IV will analyze the constitutionality of a smart gun mandate. Part V will
examine the practical roadblocks that may impede smart gun legislation
and funding. The Note concludes that smart guns themselves are
constitutional and would reduce certain types of gun deaths. Further,
although the roadblocks to smart gun implementation on a mass scale are
quite burdensome, they are not insurmountable.

I. THE SECOND AMENDMENT
This section provides the Second Amendment background
necessary to discuss the constitutional viability of smart guns. Ratified in
1791 as part of the Bill of Rights, the Second Amendment of the United
States Constitution declares that “[a] well regulated Militia, being
necessary to the security of a free State, the right of the people to keep and
bear Arms, shall not be infringed.”4 These twenty-seven words are the
subject of heated and controversial discussions among constitutional law
scholars, policymakers, politicians, gun regulation supporters, and gun
rights advocates.5
The Second Amendment debate centers around two opposing
interpretations of the text: the militia-based interpretation and the private
purposes interpretation.6 Essentially, the militia-based interpretation limits
the right to “keep and bear arms” to people, arms, and activities that have
some connection to a “well regulated Militia.”7 Conversely, the private
purpose interpretation does not confine the right to the militia. Rather, it
contends that the Second Amendment protects the right to keep and bear
arms for individual purposes, such as protecting one’s own home in selfdefense.8 The question of which interpretation would prevail as a matter
of constitutional law was resolved in the controversial 2008 Supreme

4

U.S. CONST. AMEND. II.
See, e.g., James C. Phillips & Josh Blackman, The Mysterious Meaning of the
Second Amendment, THE ATLANTIC (Feb. 28, 2020),
https://www.theatlantic.com/ideas/archive/2020/02/big-data-secondamendment/607186/ (highlighting the debate regarding the meaning of the
Second Amendment); Michael T. O'Donnell, The Second Amendment: A Study of
Recent Trends, 25 U. RICH. L. REV. 501 (1991) (stating that the “interpretation of
these twenty-seven words has generated considerable debate since they were first
declared in force in 1791”).
6
See JOSEPH BLOCHER & DARRELL A. H MILLER, THE POSITIVE SECOND
AMENDMENT 59 (Alexander Tsesis ed. 2018).
7
Id.
8
Id.
5
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Court case of District of Columbia v. Heller,9 which officially turned the
private purpose interpretation into constitutional law doctrine.
The statute in question in Heller was the District of Columbia’s
Firearms Control Regulation Act.10 The statute made it practically illegal
to possess a new handgun in the District of Columbia by simultaneously
criminalizing the possession of an unregistered firearm and prohibiting the
registration of new handguns.11 Additionally, it required residents to keep
their lawfully-owned firearms “unloaded or disassembled or bound by a
trigger lock or similar device” except when being used for lawful
recreational activities or when located in a place of business.12 Dick Heller,
a special police officer for the Thurgood Marshall Judiciary building who
was permitted to carry a handgun while on duty, challenged the
constitutional validity of the D.C. statute.13 He wanted to keep a handgun
at home for self-defense and applied for a permit, but D.C. rejected his
application.14
In a majority opinion by Justice Scalia, the Supreme Court
concluded that both the D.C. ban on handgun possession in the home and
the statute’s storage restrictions violated the Second Amendment.15 In
holding that “[t]he Second Amendment protects an individual right to
possess a firearm unconnected with service in a militia, and to use that arm
for traditionally lawful purposes, such as self-defense within the home,”16
the Supreme Court elected to adopt the private purpose interpretation of
the Second Amendment.17
While there is plenty of existing literature analyzing Heller,18 none
has directly addressed its application to smart guns. Two segments of the
9

554 U.S. 570 (2008).
BLOCHER & MILLER, supra note 6, at 52.
11
Heller, 554 U.S. at 574–75.
12
Id. at 575.
13
Id.
14
Id.
15
Id. at 635.
16
Id. at 570.
17
BLOCHER & MILLER, supra note 6, at 62.
18
See generally Kyle Hatt, Gun-Shy Originalism: The Second Amendment's
Original Purpose in District of Columbia v. Heller, 44 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 505
(2011) (examining “the conflict between Heller’s reading of the Second
Amendment’s original purpose . . . and its holding about self-defense and dicta on
the Amendment’s limitations”); Andrew R. Gould, The Hidden Second
Amendment Framework within District of Columbia v. Heller, 62 VAND. L. REV.
1535 (2019) (analyzing the Heller decision to articulate a standard of review for
gun regulations); David C. Williams, Death to Tyrants: District of Columbia v.
Heller and the Uses of Guns, 69 OHIO ST. L.J. 641 (2008) (exploring how “Scalia
departs sharply from his own preferred interpretive method” to conclude that “the
10
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majority opinion are relevant to this new issue: (1) the unconstitutionality
of the D.C. law’s particular trigger lock and gun storage requirements and
(2) the constitutional limits on the Second Amendment individual right to
keep and bear arms.
In determining the constitutionality of the D.C. law’s requirement
that “any lawful firearm in the home be disassembled or bound by a trigger
lock at all times,”19 Justice Scalia reasoned that the requirement essentially
rendered lawful firearms inoperable in the home.20 He concluded that the
“unequivocal text”21 of the D.C. law did not contain an exception for selfdefense purposes; as such, the law made it “impossible for citizens to use
[their firearms] for the core lawful purpose of self-defense.”22 Therefore,
Justice Scalia determined that the law’s requirement was
unconstitutional.23
Justice Scalia, however, also emphasized that the “[individual]
right secured by the Second Amendment is not unlimited.”24 He devoted a
section of the opinion to listing some of the constitutionally permissible
limits on the Second Amendment right. He emphasized that:
nothing in our opinion should be taken to cast doubt on longstanding
prohibitions on the possession of firearms by felons and the mentally
ill, or laws forbidding the carrying of firearms in sensitive places such
as schools and government buildings, or laws imposing conditions
and qualifications on the commercial sale of arms.25

He clarified that these “presumptively lawful regulatory measures” were
only examples and that the list was not meant to be exhaustive.26 Part IV
will explain the importance of these two segments of Heller to the
constitutionality of smart guns.

Amendment protects a right of self-defense”); Nelson Lund, The Second
Amendment, Heller, and Originalist Jurisprudence, 56 UCLA L. REV. 1343
(2009) (critiquing the majority’s originalist analysis and other forms of reasoning
as defective); Adam Winkler, Heller's Catch-22, 56 UCLA L. REV. 1551 (2009)
(highlighting various “missteps and contradictions” in the decision); Jordan E.
Pratt, A First Amendment-Inspired Approach to Heller's “Schools” and
“Government Buildings”, 92 NEB. L. REV. 537 (2014) (interpreting Heller’s
“presumptively lawful” regulations through a First Amendment approach).
19
Heller, 554 U.S. at 628.
20
Id. at 630.
21
Id.
22
Id.
23
Id.
24
Id. at 626.
25
Id. at 626–27.
26
Id.
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II. SMART GUN TECHNOLOGY
This section provides a brief overview of personalized smart gun
technologies that will be implicated in the constitutional analysis in
Section IV. Generally, firearms work in the following way: “a trigger
releases a firing pin, which strikes ammunition, causing a small and
contained explosion which launches a projectile, or bullet, down a metal
tube at a target.”27 Smart guns use technology to enable, disable, perfect,
or keep track of this process. There are multiple types of smart guns;28
however, this Note focuses specifically on personalized smart guns. Also
known as electronically controlled safety mechanisms (ECSMs) in the
military context, personalized smart guns are weapons that only the owner
or designated user can fire.29 This section examines the two most common
types of personalized smart guns and explains their underlying
mechanisms, benefits, and drawbacks, which impact their usefulness,
constitutionality, and the likelihood of their widespread adoption by the
general population.
Biometric-based trigger lock guns are one of the two common
types of personalized smart guns.30 Generally, they consist of fingerprint
or palm-based readers that unlock the firearm when the user’s biometric
information is recognized, similar to the technology that allows
smartphone owners to unlock their phones.31 There are two main types of
biometric-based trigger locks: those that use physical biometric scanners
and those that use behavioral biometrics.32 The former include fingerprint
and palm print scanners — the most common types of scanners — as well
as facial recognition and iris recognition scanners.33 The latter recognize
behavioral characteristics, such as characteristics of voice and grip.34
Kai Kloepfer, a teenager from Colorado, developed a prototype
for a biometric smart gun in response to a mass shooting.35 This prototype

27

Anthony W. Metzler, Triggered: Mass Shootings, Smart Gun Technology and
the Search for Solutions, 19 J. HIGH TECH. L. 103, 109 (2018).
28
See generally Stevenson, supra note 3 (examining semiautonomous or
precision-guided firearms, precision-guided firearms, guns that track and store
certain information like time of discharge, location, and angle of discharge, and
“glockchain” firearms that use the blockchain to safely secure firing information).
29
Id. at 693.
30
Id. at 702.
31
Id.
32
Id. at 703.
33
Id.
34
Id.
35
Metzler, supra note 27, at 122.
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is a good example of how some biometric-based trigger locks work. As
opposed to a traditional fingerprint scanner, the prototype:
uses a sensor to pass a very small electrical current through a
fingerprint, which conducts electricity to create an image that allows
the weapon to fire. Kloepfer states that the technology does not
necessarily read your fingerprint in the way one would expect; rather
it is similar to electronic signatures at the supermarket. Electronic
signatures at supermarkets determine fraud by comparing metrics of
the user, such as how a user holds the stylus. Kloepfer’s design for a
fingerprint scanner on a firearm acts in the same capacity, measuring
how an individual holds the gun as opposed to reading the lines of
their skin.36

While certainly innovative, biometric-based trigger locks are far from
perfect. For example, the technology can misread a user’s handprints or
fingerprints if the user’s hand is wet, dirty, or sweaty or if the user is
wearing gloves, thereby preventing the gun from firing.37 These problems
have been overcome to some degree by using dynamic grip recognition
instead of traditional scanners.38 Additionally, battery issues may render
the gun inoperative at times,39 though this issue is mitigated by
technologies that only use battery power when the trigger is pulled.40
Biometric technology has also been used in external firearm
locking devices. Unlike smart guns in which the authentication technology
belongs to the gun itself, these external devices are attachable to many
traditional types of firearms.41 Similar to biometric-based smart guns,
these external locks have a fingerprint scanner that allows only the
authorized user to unlock the gun.42 The IdentiLock and Viking Biometric
Trigger lock are two examples that are already commercially available.43
Some of these biometric safety attachments are reasonably priced at
eighty-nine dollars, have lasting battery power, rarely malfunction, and
can be unlocked by the authorized user in milliseconds.44 As will be shown
36

See id. (citing Katharine Gammon, The Tech Behind Smart Guns, INSIDE SCI.
(Feb. 8, 2016), https://perma.cc/BG3V-9LRF).
37
Stevenson, supra note 3, at 702; GIFFORDS LAW CTR., supra note 2, at 53.
38
Stevenson, supra note 3, at 703.
39
Id.
40
Id.
41
GIFFORDS LAW CTR., supra note 2, at 41.
42
Id.
43
IDENTILOCK, https://getidentilock.com (last visited May 5, 2020); VIKING
BIOMETRIC TRIGGER LOCK, https://vikingtriggerlock.com/ (last visited May 5,
2020).
44
Id.; see also GIFFORDS LAW CTR., supra note 2, at 52–58 (listing other reliable
personalized smart gun technologies, such as the GunGuardian and Vara).
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in Part VI, the reliability of these technological features greatly affects the
constitutionality of a smart gun mandate. Safety goals of storage mandates
can be met without imposing on gun owners’ right to bear arms in selfdefense in a life-threatening situation. If the technology is as reliable as
the smart gun manufacturers purport it to be, then they are attractive
alternatives for gun owners who wish to safely store their firearms but do
not want to deal with the potentially life-threatening burden of taking a
few seconds to unlock a traditional gun safe with a key or combination.45
The second common example of personalized smart guns are
firearms that are trigger locked by radio frequency identification (RFID)
tokens and use radio frequency to fire.46 These smart guns are equipped
with a ferrous locking mechanism that blocks the firing pin from
working.47 They have an electromagnet that is only activated when it
receives a radio wave token from an external device, such as an
electronically matched chip in the form of a watch, key fob, pendant, or
ring.48 The token contains an electromagnetic transmitter that emits a
signal to the gun, thereby disengaging the ferrous locking mechanism and
magnetically dislodging the gun’s firing pin, thus allowing the gun to be
used.49
This smart gun technology is plagued by more issues than the
biometric-based trigger locks and is therefore less likely to be
constitutional (as discussed in Part IV). For example, if the paired token is
lost, misplaced, or in another room, the gun cannot be fired.50 Like
biometric-based trigger locks, battery issues are also a problem. More
importantly, however, RFID token trigger locks are less reliable than
biometric-based trigger locks due to their susceptibility to hacking. A mere
15-dollar magnet placed near a firearm’s electromagnet is all a hacker
needs to unlock the firearm’s firing pin.51 This is the cheapest, easiest, and
most effective way to hack an RFID-locked firearm.
In sum, while the technological inefficiencies and downsides of
certain smart guns, particularly those that use RFID technology, should
not be ignored, the current state of biometric smart gun technology seems

45

See supra note 43 and accompanying discussion; see also GIFFORDS LAW CTR.,
supra note 2, at 41.
46
Metzler, supra note 27, at 120.
47
Id.
48
Stevenson, supra note 3, at 702.
49
Metzler, supra note 27, at 120.
50
Stevenson, supra note 3, at 712.
51
See id. at 709 (citing Andy Greenberg, Anybody Can Fire This ‘Locked’ Smart
Gun With $15 Worth of Magnets, WIRED (July 24, 2017, 2:06 PM),
https://bit.ly/3dqzFpC)).
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to be reliable. This reliability will likely continue to increase with future
technological developments.52

III. SMART GUNS: A LIFE-SAVING TECHNOLOGY OR A WASTE OF
RESOURCES?
This section addresses whether smart guns would help prevent
firearm-related deaths and concludes that while smart guns may not
prevent all types of firearm-related deaths, they would still help prevent
youth firearm-related suicides and accidental firearm deaths—a worthy
public health goal.
First, smart guns are an effective way to prevent youth suicides.53
Firearm suicide rates among children and adolescents are particularly
alarming. The suicide rate among children and adolescents has increased
by sixty-five percent over the last ten years.54 Out of all the gun-related
deaths in children and adolescents in 2016, thirty-five percent were
suicides.55 In that same year, more than 1,100 adolescents (ten – nineteen
years old) died by firearm suicide.56 In 2017, forty-three percent of youth
suicides involved a firearm.57 Importantly, over eighty percent of children
and adolescent firearm suicides involved a firearm belonging to a family
member.58 This statistic, coupled with the fact that 4.6 million children in
the United States live in a home with an unlocked, loaded firearm, helps

52

See GIFFORDS LAW CTR., supra note 2, at 52–58 (describing different brands
and types of reliable smart gun technology that is currently in development or on
sale: Biofire Technologies, iGun Technolgies, Sentinl, Vara, and GunGuardian).
It is worth noting that the accuracy of the Biofire smart gun’s fingerprint scanner
is 99.999% and is therefore more reliable than the firearm’s mechanical
components. Additionally, the Biofire handgun “is about as hackable as a toaster.”
Id. at 53.
53
Stevenson, supra note 3, at 704.
54
See generally EVERYTOWN FOR GUN SAFETY, DISRUPTING ACCESS:
ADDRESSING FIREARM SUICIDE IN THE U.S. (Sept. 10, 2018),
https://everytownresearch.org/reports/disrupting-access/ (providing a statistical
report of firearm suicides in the U.S.).
55
See EVERYTOWN FOR GUN SAFETY, FIREARM SUICIDE IN THE UNITED STATES
(Aug. 30, 2019), https://everytownresearch.org/firearm-suicide/ (providing an
updated report and analysis of firearm suicides in the U.S.).
56
See Richard Florida & Nicole Javorsky, Teen Suicide Rates Are Higher In States
Where More People Own Guns, CITYLAB (Jan. 29, 2019, 10:50 AM),
https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2019-01-29/researchers-link-u-s-gunownership-and-youth-suicide (providing statistics on youth suicide and gun
ownership, concluding that teen suicide rates are higher in states where more
people own guns).
57
Id.
58
EVERYTOWN (2019), supra note 55.
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explain why firearm suicide among youths occurs at such high rates.59
Further, studies suggest that unsafe firearm storage is highly associated
with firearm suicide among children and adolescents.60
Additionally, teenagers with no access to firearms rarely find
substitutive means to commit suicide.61 Thus, making it harder for children
and teenagers to access and operate family members’ firearms decreases
the likelihood of adolescent suicide. Smart guns accomplish this goal: by
restricting the operation of the firearm to only the authorized users—such
as the parents—smart guns prevent the situations in which a child or
teenager finds a family member’s firearm and uses it to commit suicide.
While some may argue that smart guns would not be effective in
preventing these types of suicides because the teenager would simply look
for a suicide method that does not involve a firearm, this belief is mistaken:
the most common alternative suicide methods to firearm are substantially
less lethal.62 Therefore, given that most youth suicides tend to be
impulsive63 and that firearm suicides are disproportionately lethal
compared to other suicide methods, smart guns are an effective way to
prevent these tragedies. It is important to note, however, that smart guns
are likely to be ineffective in preventing the leading cause of firearm

59

EVERYTOWN (2018), supra note 54.
See, e.g., Anita Knopov et al., Household Gun Ownership and Youth Suicide
Rates at the State Level, 2005–2015, 56 AM. J. OF PREVENTIVE MED. 335–42
(2019), https://www.ajpmonline.org/article/S0749-3797(18)32383-3/fulltext
(finding a positive association between gun ownership and youth suicides);
Seema Shah et al., Adolescent Suicide and Household Access to Firearms in
Colorado: Results of a Case-Control Study, 26 J. OF ADOLESCENT HEALTH 157,
157–63 (2000) (concluding that limiting household access to firearms may reduce
teenage suicides).
61
See Knopov et al., supra note 60, at 339 (observing no “substitution effect”
when firearms are not present); see also AM. ACAD. OF PEDIATRICS, FirearmRelated Injuries Affecting the Pediatric Population, 130 PEDIATRICS e1416,
e1418 (2012), https://pediatrics.aappublications.org/content/130/5/e1416
(concluding that “[t]he association of a gun in the home and increased risk of
suicide among adolescents has been well documented . . . this association is
significant even in those teens without a previous psychiatric diagnosis”).
62
See GIFFORDS LAW CTR, supra note 2, at 32 (noting that “[s]uicide attempters
die 84% of the time when a gun is used, while suicide attempts by drug overdose
have only a 2.5% fatality rate, jumping has a 20% fatality rate, and self-inflicted
cutting has a less than 1% fatality rate. The bottom line: a suicide prevented by
removing access to a gun may be a life saved”).
63
See id. at 31 (stating that teenagers can act on suicidal ideations within five
minutes); see AM. ACAD. OF PEDIATRICS, supra note 61 (stating that
“[a]dolescents are at a relatively high risk of attempting suicide as a consequence
of their often impulsive behavior”).
60
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deaths, adult suicide,64 as the various user authentication processes are
rendered meaningless when the authorized, suicidal adult intends to use
the smart gun.
Smart guns are also an effective way to protect children and
teenagers from accidental shootings.65 There have been at least 1,777
unintentional shootings by children since 2015, resulting in 656 deaths and
1,169 injuries.66 While these types of deaths comprise a small percentage
of all firearm-related deaths,67 measures to mitigate the likelihood of
accidental gun deaths in children should still be pursued. When it comes
to firearms, these tragic deaths may be the most preventable: smart guns
would help prevent them because most unintentional firearm injuries and
deaths involve guns belonging to relatives.68 By only permitting
authorized users to fire the gun, smart guns would prevent children from
unintentionally shooting, injuring, or killing each other or themselves if
they find a relative’s improperly stored gun.69 Additionally, the potential
of personalized smart guns to help reduce these sorts of deaths has become
more relevant and the issue has become even more pressing with the recent
increase in unintentional shootings by children during the COVID-19
pandemic,70 which has coincided with an increase in gun sales.71
64

Stevenson, supra note 3, at 709.
GIFFORDS LAW CTR., supra note 2, at 33.
66
See EVERYTOWN FOR GUN SAFETY, #NOTANACCIDENT INDEX (2021),
https://everytownresearch.org/notanaccident/#15554 (providing an index for the
total number of accidental firearm injuries and deaths in the U.S.).
67
See Rebecca M. Cunningham et al., The Major Causes of Death in Children
and Adolescents in the United States, 379 NEW ENG. J. OF MED. 2468, 2468 (2018)
(stating that among total adolescents and children firearm deaths in 2016, 4% were
unintentional deaths such as accidental discharge, while 59% were homicides and
35% were suicides).
68
Stevenson, supra note 3, at 700.
69
Id.; see also Deborah Azrael et al., Firearm Storage in Gun-Owning
Households with Children: Results of a 2015 National Survey, 95 J. OF URB.
HEALTH 295, 296, 304 (2018) (demonstrating that there are strong correlations
between laws that restrict children’s access to guns and decreased child firearm
deaths, as well as strong correlations between the presence of a firearm at home
and an increased likelihood of accidental child firearm deaths).
70
Erin Donaghue, "Alarming" spike in deadly unintentional shootings by kids as
gun sales soar during lockdowns, CBS NEWS (May 8, 2020, 12:36 PM),
https://www.cbsnews.com/news/unintentional-shootings-guns-kids-salescoronavirus-lockdowns/.
71
See EVERYTOWN FOR GUN SAFETY, COVID-19 GUNS: ADDRESSING GUN
VIOLENCE AMID THE CORONAVIRUS 3 (2020), https://everytown.org/documents/
2020/04/21984.pdf/ (describing how the recent “surge in gun purchases” may
increase firearm-related injuries and deaths in the home); see also Jackie Powder,
Surge of Gun Sales Amid COVID-19 Worries Experts, JOHNS HOPKINS
65
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Critics argue that smart guns would not prevent accidental
discharges by children because research has shown that most people who
would buy a smart gun already have other traditional firearms in their
homes. Thus, the same risk would still be present in most homes regardless
of the presence of a smart gun.72 These concerns, however, are resolved if
biometric-based trigger lock attachments are made mandatory through
legislation.73 Given that these attachments can turn most traditional
firearms into smart firearms, they could make gun-owning homes safer by
reducing the likelihood of an accidental discharge by a child while
simultaneously enabling quick and easy access to the firearm by adults in
the house.
Smart guns, however, would not prevent domestic violence cases
involving firearms and many types of firearm-related homicides because
the perpetrators in these situations usually use their own guns to commit
such crimes.74 Additionally, while smart guns may have helped prevent
mass shootings in a minority of cases,75 most firearms used in mass
shootings are acquired legally.76 Therefore, a personalized smart gun
would not help prevent most of these atrocities because the gun is
programmed to activate for the shooter 77
Smart gun technology, however, is likely to be an effective guard
against gun theft.78 Gun theft is a serious criminal issue in the United States
because firearms are stolen from private citizens between 170,000 to
350,000 times each year.79 Additionally, ten to fifteen percent of stolen
BLOOMBERG SCH. OF PUB. HEALTH INSIGHTS (Apr. 9, 2020),
https://www.jhsph.edu/covid-19/articles/gun-sales-surge-amid-coronavirusanxiety.html (stating that there was an increase in gun background check filings
of more than 1.8 million in February and March 2020 compared to the same period
last year). While “[b]ackground checks don’t equate to individual gun sales, as
one check may be for multiple gun purchases, . . . [background checks] are
generally viewed as a proxy for firearm demand.” Id.
72
Stevenson, supra note 3, at 709–10.
73
See infra, Section IV.A.1.
74
Stevenson, supra note 3, at 723.
75
See Larry Buchanan & Josh Keller, How They Got Their Guns, N.Y. TIMES
(Feb. 16, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2015/10/03/us/how-massshooters-got-their-guns.html (explaining that Adam Lanza, the twenty-year-old
responsible for the Sandy Hook Elementary School massacre, used his mother’s
guns to kill 26 people–mostly children).
76
Metzler, supra note 27, at 124.
77
See Buchanan & Keller, supra note 75 (covering how different mass shooters
obtained their firearms and highlighting that most mass shooters obtained their
firearms legally).
78
GIFFORDS LAW CTR., supra note 2, at 35.
79
Id. at 36, 98.
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firearms are later used in crimes.80 Smart guns may help prevent the issues
associated with gun theft by making the gun inoperable and worthless to
the criminals who are not able to successfully reengineer the stolen smart
guns.81 Further, not only could smart guns help reduce the number of guns
available on the black market that are later used to commit crimes,82 but
smart guns could also prevent the criminal from using the owner’s own
gun against her in the course of the theft.83
Moreover, smart guns could prevent law enforcement officers
from being attacked with their own weapons.84 In 2018, for example,
thirteen percent of officers feloniously killed were shot with their own
weapons.85 Smart guns could thus prevent these situations because the
police officer’s gun would be inoperable to the criminal who obtains it. It
is important to note, however, that some law enforcement agencies have
opposed smart guns both because of reliability concerns and because they
worry that they may inhibit the officer’s safety when she has to use her
partner’s gun to protect herself.86 While this could be an issue, officers
could program their smart guns to authorize their partners’ fingerprints or
other biometrical identification information.

IV. CONSTITUTIONALITY OF SMART GUNS
This Note has delved into the relevant background of the most
influential Second Amendment case, the state of current smart gun
technology, and smart guns’ potential to mitigate certain firearm-related
deaths. It is now essential to determine whether personalized smart guns
are constitutional—if they are not, their potential benefits and the heated
debates regarding their implementation and practicability should and will
be confined to the realm of law school hypotheticals and science fiction
novels. For that purpose, this section will first provide a brief background
on the most common test that courts have used to assess the
constitutionality of firearm regulations post-Heller. It will then delve into
which standard of review is most likely to be used by courts in determining
whether smart gun legislation is constitutional. Finally, it will apply
different constitutional tests to assess whether a smart gun mandate would
pass constitutional muster.
80
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A. Background
1. Smart Gun Mandate: What Would it Look Like?
Before discussing what the appropriate test is for determining the
constitutionality of a smart gun mandate, it is essential to define the
mandate itself. Importantly, a mandatory firearm buy-back or trade-in
program in which the government obtains citizens’ firearms in order to
either install smart-gun technology or replace their traditional firearms
would be unconstitutional because it would temporarily deprive gun
owners of their right to self-defense.87 On the other end of the spectrum,
there is essentially no question that a gun store’s decision to sell smart
guns is constitutional and in accordance with the Second Amendment
because of the state action doctrine.88 The more controversial question and
the subject of this section, however, is whether a smart gun mandate from
the legislature, one that only permitted the sale of smart guns and
prohibited the sale of traditional firearms, would be constitutional. This
section concludes that mandates that require all new firearms sold from a
certain date onwards to be smart guns or that require all new guns to be
smart guns while also requiring existing gun owners to implement external
smart gun attachments at the government’s expense are likely
constitutional.
2. The Two-Part Test: The Most Comon Constitutional Framwork
As mentioned in Section II, the majority in Heller determined that
the Second Amendment protects the right to keep and bear arms for
individual purposes like self-defense while also emphasizing that such a
right is “not unlimited.”89 Particularly relevant to the issue of smart guns,
the majority mentioned that “laws imposing conditions and qualifications
on the commercial sale of arms”90 could still be constitutionally
permissible. The majority also clarified that its list of specific examples of
87

Metzler, supra note 27, at 126–27.
See LEGAL INFO. INST., State Action Requirement, https://www.law.cornell.edu/
wex/state_action_requirement (last visited May 5, 2020) (stating that the
Constitution generally prohibits only governmental infringement of constitutional
rights, not the actions of private actors); see also Mike Kelly, NJ's 'smart gun' law
may get new life. But will it be effective?, NORTHJERSEY.COM (Mar. 8, 2018, 10:10
AM),
https://www.northjersey.com/story/news/columnists/mike-kelly/2018/03/08/njssmart-gun-law-may-get-new-life-but-effective/331149002/ (quoting an NRA
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constitutionally permissible restrictions on firearms was not meant to be
exhaustive.91
The Heller decision, however, still left many questions unanswered.
Most pressingly, it did not clarify how lower courts were supposed to
assess the constitutionality of firearm regulations. In other words, the
Heller majority did not announce a standard of review for striking down
or determining the constitutionality of gun regulations. While the majority
specified that the rational basis scrutiny standard “could not be used to
evaluate the extent to which a legislature may regulate a specific,
enumerated right [such as] . . . the right to keep and bear arms,”92 it
emphasized that “[u]nder any of the standards of scrutiny that [the
Supreme Court has] applied to enumerated constitutional rights, banning
from the home ‘the most preferred firearm in the nation to keep and use
for protection of one’s home and family,’ would fail constitutional
muster.”93 Justice Scalia refused to announce and apply a standard of
review because he reasoned that the D.C. law was a categorically
unjustifiable violation of the Second Amendment.94 Constitutional law
scholar Eugene Volokh has interpreted this to be a “per se invalidation” of
an especially severe burden to the individual right to keep and bear arms.95
Therefore, the only limits stated in Heller regarding the constitutional
standard of review for gun regulations are that rational basis scrutiny and
Justice Breyer’s “judge-empowering ‘interest-balancing inquiry’” are both
inappropriate frameworks.96 Thus, in determining whether a smart gun
mandate is constitutional, a court is likely to have a decent amount of
flexibility in deciding what constitutional standard of review to apply.
Courts and scholars agree that the most prevalent framework used by
lower courts in determining the constitutionality of firearm laws is a twoprong inquiry.97 The two-part test consists of the following elements: first,
courts ask “whether a challenged law imposes a burden on conduct falling
within the scope of the Second Amendment,” and, second, if it does, courts

91

Id. at 626 (stating that the Court is “not undertak[ing] an exhaustive historical
analysis . . . of the full scope of the Second Amendment”).
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Id. at 628 n.27.
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Id. at 628–29 (quoting Parker v. District of Columbia, 478 F.3d 370, 400 (D.C.
Cir. 2007).
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Kimberly, supra note 3, at 263.
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Eugene Volokh, Implementing the Right to Keep and Bear Arms for SelfDefense: An Analytical Framework and a Research Agenda, 56 UCLA L. REV.
1443, 1462 (2009).
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Heller, 554 U.S. at 634 (quoting id. at 689 (Breyer, J., dissenting)).
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Eric Ruben & Joseph Blocher, From Theory to Doctrine: An Empirical Analysis
of the Right to Keep and Bear Arms After Heller, 67 DUKE L.J. 1433, 1451 (2018).
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ask “whether the law satisfies [the applicable level of] scrutiny.”98 The
Third, Fourth, Fifth, Sixth, Seventh, Ninth, Tenth, Eleventh, and D.C.
Circuits have generally adopted the two-part test.99 Whereas the two-part
test has been more commonly used in federal courts than in state courts,100
the majority of Second Amendment litigation has occurred in state
courts.101 While the most common level of scrutiny in evaluating the
constitutionality of gun regulations is intermediate scrutiny,102 it is also
possible that a court could apply strict scrutiny.
3. Courts Are Most Likely to Use the Two-Part Test to Evaluate the
Constitutionality of a Smart Gun Mandate.
In future litigation, the most likely framework to be applied to a
smart gun mandate is the common two-part test with intermediate
scrutiny.103 First, a court faced with a constitutional challenge to a smart
gun mandate would likely apply the two-part test. Courts of Appeals have
widely adopted this framework and the number of cases applying the test
have continued to increase steadily in recent years.104 Second, such a court
would likely apply intermediate scrutiny in the two-part test because
courts have tended to apply this level of scrutiny in cases concerning the
constitutionality of gun regulations.105 Additionally, “[i]ntermediate
98

GIFFORDS LAW CTR. TO PREVENT GUN VIOLENCE, POST-HELLER LITIGATION
SUMMARY 3–4 (2020), https://giffords.org/wp-content/uploads/2020/07/
Giffords-Law-Center-Post-Heller-Litigation-Summary-July-2020.pdf.
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Ruben & Blocher, supra note 97, at 1452 n.88.
100
Id. at 1490 (stating that “[j]ust 32 percent of state appellate challenges applied
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Id. at 1473.
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See id. at 1496 (providing evidence that “[i]ntermediate scrutiny has been the
most prevalent form of scrutiny, no matter which category of court one
considers”).
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See id. at 1437 (quoting Nat’l Rifle Ass’n of Am. v. Bureau of Alcohol,
Tobacco, Firearms, & Explosives, 700 F.3d 185, 194 (5th Cir. 2012)) (stating that
“the two-part test . . . ‘has emerged as the prevailing approach’” in evaluating the
constitutionality of gun regulations).
104
Id. at 1490–91.
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See N.Y. State Rifle & Pistol Ass’n, Inc. v. Cuomo, 804 F.3d 242, 264 (2d Cir.
2015) (applying intermediate scrutiny to an assault weapons and large-capacity
magazine ban); Heller v. District of Columbia (Heller II), 670 F.3d 1244, 1256
(D.C. Cir. 2011) (applying intermediate scrutiny to determine whether a law
imposing firearm registration requirements and prohibiting assault weapons and
large-capacity magazines was constitutional); United States v. Schultz, No. 1:08CR-75-TS, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 234, at *15 (N. D. Ind. Jan. 5, 2009) (applying
intermediate scrutiny to determine whether the federal felon-in-possession ban
applied to someone who had been convicted of failure to pay child support);
United States v. Williams, 616 F.3d 685, 692–94 (7th Cir. 2010) (holding that a
prohibition of firearm possession by felons survived intermediate scrutiny);
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scrutiny has been the most prevalent form of scrutiny [in assessing the
constitutionality of gun regulations], no matter which category of court
one considers.”106 For example, in Jackson v. City of San Francisco,107 the
U.S Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit assessed the constitutionality
of a San Francisco law that required guns in the home to be “stored in a
locked container or disabled with a trigger lock that has been approved by
the California Department of Justice.”108 Using the common two-part
test,109 the court first asked “whether the challenged law burdened conduct
protected by the Second Amendment.”110 After concluding that the law
was “within the scope of the Second Amendment,”111 the court then
determined the appropriate level of scrutiny. In doing so, the court
analyzed (1) how close the law is to a Second Amendment right and (2)
how severely the law burdens the right.112 While the court observed that
the law was a “core burden on the Second Amendment” because it made
it more difficult for a gun owner to use her gun in self-defense, the court
concluded that the burden was not substantial since a modern gun safe
could be opened quickly.113 The court then proceeded to apply
intermediate scrutiny to the San Francisco law, concluding that the law
survived that test.114
One potential criticism of the two-part test is that courts do not
typically refer to it explicitly. An empirical study revealed that courts in
just thirty-two percent of state appellate challenges and forty-six percent
of federal challenges to gun regulations explicitly used the two-part test.115
Thus, critics would argue that a court evaluating the constitutionality of a
smart gun mandate would not apply the two-part test because only a
minority of constitutional challenges to gun regulations have explicitly
applied it.116 However, the two-part test has likely been underreported in
United States v. Marzzarella, 614 F.3d 85, 97 (3d Cir. 2010) (concluding that
intermediate scrutiny was an appropriate standard of review in determining
whether a statute prohibiting the purchase of guns with obliterated serial numbers
was constitutional).
106
Ruben & Blocher, supra note 97, at 1496.
107
746 F.3d 953, 958 (9th Cir. 2014).
108
Kimberly, supra note 3, at 269 (quoting Jackson, 746 F.3d at 958).
109
See, e.g., United States v. Chovan, 735 F.3d 1127, 1141 (9th Cir. 2013)
(applying a two-step analysis to determine that intermediate scrutiny applied to a
“prohibition on gun possession by domestic violence misdemeanants”).
110
Kimberly, supra note 3, at 270 (quoting Jackson, 746 F.3d at 960).
111
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empirical studies because “courts may not be explicit when they are using
the two-part test,”117 instead skipping to the second step of the test and
assuming that the law is covered by the Second Amendment.118
Additionally, there is enough precedent from various United States Courts
of Appeals establishing the two-part test as the appropriate framework for
evaluating gun regulations that lower courts are likely to be bound by
precedent. Therefore, even though courts applying the two-part test to gun
regulations are seemingly in a minority, a court evaluating the
constitutionality of a smart gun mandate is likely to apply such a test.

B. Applying the Two-Part Test with Intermediate Scrutiny to a
Smart Gun Mandate
Given that a court is likely to apply the two-part test with
intermediate scrutiny to a smart gun mandate, it is essential to determine
whether such a mandate would survive the test. Under the first prong, a
court would find that a smart gun mandate “imposes a burden on conduct
falling within the scope of the Second Amendment”119 because of smart
guns’ potential impediment to self-defense and because the traditional
firearms that would no longer be available for sale after the mandate are
like those firearms in “common use at the time”120 of ratification.
However, under the second prong of the test—the applicable level
of scrutiny—a smart gun mandate is likely to survive intermediate scrutiny
because it would satisfy both elements of the constitutional standard of
review. To survive intermediate scrutiny, the statute in question must (1)
further an important government interest and (2) do so by means that are
substantially related to that interest.121
First, a court could easily find that in mandating biometric-based
trigger lock attachments for traditional firearms and in restricting the sale
of new firearms to only smart guns, the state or federal government
proposing such law has a significant interest in preventing child gun
deaths, teenage firearm suicides, and gun thefts. In concluding that a smart
gun mandate serves an important government interest, a court could point
117
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119
See GIFFORDS LAW CTR. TO PREVENT GUN VIOLENCE, POST-HELLER LITIGATION
SUMMARY 3 (2020), https://giffords.org/wp-content/uploads/2020/07/GiffordsLaw-Center-Post-Heller-Litigation-Summary-July-2020.pdf (discussing the twopart test).
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See United States v. Miller, 307 U.S. 174, 179 (1939) (analyzing the second
amendment’s historical purpose).
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wex/intermediate_scrutiny (last visited Nov. 11, 2020) (defining intermediate
scrutiny) (emphasis added).
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to the type of empirical evidence mentioned in Section III above to support
its conclusion. Second, a court would be likely to find that the law
“further[ed] an important government interest”122 because smart guns
allow only authorized users to operate the guns, thus reducing the
likelihood that a teenager would use the gun to commit suicide or that a
child would find the gun and accidentally discharge it. Further, smart guns
are more aligned with the right to self-defense than other gun safety
storage mechanisms: they are easier and quicker to operate than the safes
and other storage methods mandated under the constitutionally
permissible San Francisco law in Jackson.123 If other courts approach the
issue in the same way as Jackson, a smart gun mandate is likely to pass
the first element of the second prong.
While the first element under intermediate scrutiny is likely to be
relatively uncontroversial, the second element—the tailoring requirement
under intermediate scrutiny—is more likely to be a point of contention
among litigants arguing the constitutionality of a smart gun mandate.
Thus, this subsection will focus more extensively on this element.
Due to Heller’s emphasis on the right to keep and bear arms for
personal purposes, a court applying the intermediate scrutiny tailoring
requirement to a smart gun mandate would likely consider the reliability
of smart gun technology to be an important issue in addressing the
constitutionality of a smart gun mandate. Critics of smart guns argue that
the technology is not reliable and would thus inhibit the firearms from
being used effectively for self-defense purposes. Pointing to the
hackability of RFID-based smart guns and the potential glitches of
biometric-based smart guns, they argue that “[a]ny impediment to [a gunowner’s] reaction time . . . could mean the difference between life and
death.”124 However, more research is currently needed to determine
whether smart gun technology is as unreliable as the critics claim it to be,
as some of the studies exposing the potential deficiencies of smart gun
technologies are over five years old.125
The available evidence suggests that the current state of smart gun
technology is substantially more reliable than what the critics purport.126
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For example, the Viking Biometric Fingerprint Trigger Lock releases in
.03 seconds, has 360-degree fingerprint recognition, is weather and dust
resistant, and has a false rejection rate of .001%.127 If the manufacturer’s
claims are proven to be accurate by independent studies, then a mandate
requiring the use of this technology would be constitutional because it
would not inhibit gun-owners from effectively using their firearms in selfdefense. Further, some advanced fingerprint scanners report false
authentication rates as low as .01%, which are much lower than the rate of
expected mechanical malfunctions in traditional firearms.128 While critics
may still worry that fingerprint scanners could be unreliable if used with
dirty hands, as in the familiar smartphone context, dynamic grip
recognition technology avoids this issue while still being “individual to
the user, reproducible, and measurable.”129
Finally, certain forms of smart guns have been embraced by law
enforcement agencies,130 which suggests that they are sufficiently reliable
for self-defense purposes. When law enforcement officers’ use of smart
guns becomes more commonplace, a smart gun mandate is more likely to
pass constitutional muster. Thus, the current state of smart gun technology,
likely future improvements, and an increased use by law enforcement
officers suggest that a smart gun mandate would be constitutional under
Heller because the technology is likely reliable and would thus not infringe
on the individual right to keep and bear arms.
In a similar vein, critics may also argue that legislation mandating
smart guns would be categorically prohibited because it would be too
similar to the D.C. law rejected in Heller.131 Just like the D.C. law’s
requirement that guns be disassembled or kept under a trigger lock when
stored in the home, a smart gun mandate might similarly render the guns
inoperable. This argument falls shorts upon closer analysis. In contrast to
the D.C. law that rendered firearms inoperable in the home, a smart gun
mandate would not render firearms inoperable because the available
evidence suggests that the technology is reliable and the mandate itself
would not be intended to make them inoperable. Rather than rendering
guns inoperable, the mandate would merely ensure that only the authorized
user would be able to use the firearm. Additionally, smart gun technology
is more likely to facilitate self-defense as compared to other forms of
firearm storage. For example, as opposed to the burdensome process of
of the Biofire smart gun’s fingerprint scanner is 99.999%, which is more reliable
than the firearm’s mechanical components).
127
VIKING TRIGGER LOCK, supra note 43.
128
GIFFORDS LAW CTR., supra note 2, at 40.
129
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130
Id. at 37.
131
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retrieving a gun from an electronic or mechanical safe, a gun owner could
simply store her smart gun in a bedside drawer, confident that she will be
able to access it quickly in case of emergency while simultaneously
ensuring that her child or teenager cannot operate it. Thus, a mandate that
only allowed the sale of smart guns and required existing gun owners to
attach biometric-based locks to their traditional firearms is constitutional
and does not amount to a “destruction of the right.”132
Finally, such a smart gun mandate would be constitutional under
Heller because it does not amount to a total ban on guns. Unlike the law
rejected in Heller that practically banned handguns in D.C., a smart gun
mandate would still allow gun owners to exercise their Second
Amendment right. The right articulated in Heller does not extend to
unauthorized and unintended users. In sum, “there is not yet a
constitutional basis for objecting to [a] smart-guns-only regime”133 under
Heller and a smart gun mandate is likely to survive the second prong of
the intermediate scrutiny standard.

C. Alternatives to the Two-Part Test with Intermediate Scrutiny
This subsection will provide a brief survey of other frameworks,
standards, and tests that could be used to evaluate the constitutionality of
a smart gun mandate. Where relevant, this subsection will also explain
why the best option is the two-part test with intermediate scrutiny.
1. Two-Part Test with Strict Scrutiny.
While a smart gun mandate is likely constitutional under
intermediate scrutiny, it is unclear whether it would be able to survive “the
most demanding test in constitutional law”:134 strict scrutiny. Strict
scrutiny requires that the statute in question be (1) genuinely necessary to
serve a compelling government interest and (2) narrowly tailored to
achieve that interest.135 If less restrictive means are available to
accomplish the government’s compelling interest, then the statute fails
strict scrutiny.136
The government does have a compelling interest in reducing
certain firearm-related deaths and preventing gun thefts. However, given
that there are other means to achieve the governmental interest of reducing
firearm-related deaths and gun thefts, such as traditional gun safes and
132

See District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 629 (2008) (quoting State v.
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mechanical trigger locks, it is possible that a smart gun mandate would be
found to be insufficiently tailored and would thus fail strict scrutiny.
However, because smart guns are the only existing firearm tool that could
effectively reduce the likelihood of accidental gun deaths and teenage
suicides while simultaneously being easy and quick to use for self-defense
purposes, it is still possible that a smart gun mandate would survive strict
scrutiny assuming no similar and competing technology arises.
In any case, intermediate scrutiny is still more likely to be applied
than strict scrutiny in smart gun cases because “[s]trict scrutiny does not
apply automatically any time an enumerated right is involved”137 and
intermediate scrutiny is the most common type of scrutiny used in Second
Amendment cases in both state and federal courts.138 Thus, a smart gun
mandate is likely to be constitutional.
2. History, Text, and Tradition Framework.
A popular alternative to the two-part test is one based on history,
text, and tradition.139 In Friedman v. City of Highland Park, III,140 rather
than applying the two-part framework, the court instead asked “whether a
regulation bans weapons that were common at the time of ratification . . .
and whether law-abiding citizens retain adequate means of selfdefense.”141 Given that traditional firearms are more similar to those that
were “common at the time of ratification,”142 a court could declare a law
mandating that all new firearms for sale be smart guns and requiring
firearm owners to attach biometric based trigger locks to their traditional
firearms to be unconstitutional because it goes against the history, text,
and tradition of the Second Amendment. However, the type of “original
historical analysis [that was seen in Heller has] not [been] the sole driving
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United States v. Marzzarella, 614 F.3d 85, 96 (3d Cir. 2010). See United States
v. Chester, 628 F.3d 673, 682 (4th Cir. 2010) (stating “[w]e do not apply strict
scrutiny whenever a law impinges upon a right specifically enumerated in the Bill
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force in Second Amendment cases,”143 and it is possible that courts’
reliance on the growing body of precedent may be displacing pure
historical and originalist reasoning in Second Amendment cases.144
3. Undue Burden Test.
Some critics of using intermediate and strict scrutiny for gun
regulations argue that Planned Parenthood v. Casey’s undue burden test145
is more appropriate for dealing with regulations that implicate the Second
Amendment.146 In essence, under the undue burden test, the court conducts
a three-pronged analysis. It determines whether (1) the right impacted by
the law in question is a fundamental right, and, if it is, (2) whether the
government has a legitimate interest in placing a restriction on the exercise
of that right. If the court determines that the state does have a legitimate
interest, the court then (3) analyzes whether the law poses an undue burden
on the exercise of the fundamental right.147 If the court determines that the
law in question does pose an undue burden, the inquiry is over because an
undue burden on a fundamental right is per se unconstitutional.148
Supporters of the undue burden test argue that it is the best standard of
review for gun regulations because “the rights at stake in the contexts of
abortion and gun control” are similar.149 Additionally, the undue burden
test has been the test predominantly used in state gun control cases, and
courts are more likely to regard Second Amendment rights as liberty
rights.150
The two-part test with levels of scrutiny approach, however, is still
the more appropriate standard of review for gun regulations because
Justice Scalia explicitly acknowledged the level of scrutiny approach in
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See Ruben & Blocher, supra note 97 at 1491; Lawrence Rosenthal, The Limits
of Second Amendment Originalism and the Constitutional Case for Gun Control,
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Heller and did not acknowledge the undue burden test.151 In addressing
Justice Breyer’s dissent, Justice Scalia criticized him for “propos[ing] . . .
none of the traditionally expressed levels (strict scrutiny, intermediate
scrutiny, rational basis)”152 of judicial review, and instead proposing a
general interest-balancing test.153 In doing so, Justice Scalia implied that
levels of scrutiny should be used for evaluating Second Amendment
restrictions. Furthermore, the use of the levels of scrutiny approach to
determining the constitutionality of gun regulation has steadily increased
in recent years, suggesting that a court evaluating the constitutionality of
a smart gun mandate would be more likely to apply the levels of scrutiny
approach than an undue burden test.154 The levels of scrutiny approach is
more appropriate because it is more in accordance with the language in
Heller and other court precedents.
Even if a court does use the undue burden test in assessing the
constitutionality of a smart gun mandate, such a mandate would still be
likely to survive the undue burden test. Some proponents of the undue
burden test argue that a smart gun mandate would fail the test because
purported cost, functionality, and reliability issues associated with smart
guns would pose an undue burden on gun owners.155 However, this is still
unlikely to be the case because the evidence suggests that smart gun
technology is not prohibitively expensive and the available technology is
more reliable than critics suggest.156 Not only is an eighty-nine-dollar
biometric trigger lock attachment unlikely to be deemed unduly expensive,
but the government could offset the cost of such devices through subsidies,
grants, and rebates, thus eliminating the price barrier for gun-owners who
cannot afford the technology.
4. Eugene Volokh’s Framework.
Finally, some scholars reject both the levels of scrutiny approach
and the undue burden tests for laws implicating the Second Amendment.
Most notably, Eugene Volokh has argued that the traditional standards of
review do not fit the Second Amendment context.157 Instead, he proposes
a framework of three categories of restrictions to the Second Amendment:
how, who, and cost restrictions.158 These categories focus on how guns are
stored, who is restricted from owning guns, and the different measures that
151
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make owning a firearm more expensive.159 Importantly, a smart gun
mandate is likely to be in accordance with this framework. Not only have
scholars argued that a smart gun-only regime would be constitutionally
permissible under Volokh’s how, who, and expense framework,160 but
Volokh himself has also suggested that smart guns are likely to be
constitutionally permissible if certain criteria are met. A smart gun
mandate would not be a substantial burden and should be upheld if “the
extra cost is relatively modest, the technology is highly reliable, and the
batteries are extremely long-lived . . . [and] [t]his sort of low cost / high
reliability outcome seems quite possible as the technology matures.”161
In sum, if independent studies confirm what the current data suggests
about the reliability of smart gun technology, then a smart gun mandate is
likely to be constitutional under the potentially applicable standards of
review.

V. PRACTICAL ROADBLOCKS
While a smart gun mandate is likely constitutional, there are many
non-constitutional hurdles to the implementation, normalization, and
large-scale adoption of smart guns. This section will delve into the
practical hurdles impeding smart gun research and legislation.
From a practical standpoint, the most substantial hurdle to a smart
guns mandate is the significant supply of traditional firearms that are
currently in circulation in the United States, which makes the enforcement
costs of a smart gun mandate very high. Critics of smart guns are right to
point out that the 393 million firearms owned by civilians would make it
prohibitively expensive and practically impossible to mandate
replacement of these firearms with brand new smart guns.162 Thus, even if
smart guns themselves are able to prevent certain kinds of firearm-related
deaths, they would only have a minimal impact because current gun
owners would continue to possess traditional firearms.163 A smart gun
mandate requiring all new firearms to be sold with smart gun technology,
they argue, would not prevent teenage firearm suicides or accidental child
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gun deaths because traditional weapons would still be in millions of
homes.
While critics are right that a traditional gun-buy-back or trade-in
program would be impracticable, biometric based trigger lock attachments
could improve the security of millions of existing firearms without
requiring gun owners to buy new smart guns or trade in their traditional
guns.164 These attachments are reasonably priced, allegedly reliable, can
be attached to the most common types of traditional firearms, and do not
inhibit the right to use firearms for self-defense. A state or federal
government mandate requiring the implementation of this type of smart
gun technology to existing guns would be both constitutional and
practicable.
Economic and market hurdles are also likely to impede the
implementation of smart guns. First, critics point out that individual smart
guns, some costing $1,800, are prohibitively expensive.165 Allowing only
smart guns to be sold would thus bar a whole class of people—those who
cannot afford the expensive price tag—from buying a gun. Second, they
claim that there is a lack of market demand for smart guns: while most gun
owners support the sale of smart guns concurrently with traditional guns,
few of them are actually willing to buy smart guns.166
To lower the costs of individual smart guns, the government could
provide supply-side incentives to manufacturers such as tax credits and
subsidies as well as provide grants to private companies to incentivize
research in this area.167 The government could also perform its own
research on smart gun technology. These methods would drive down the
price of individual smart guns by encouraging their mass production.
Additionally, governments could use similar strategies to increase
consumer demand for smart guns. For example, by providing consumers
with tax credits, rebates, and reimbursements for smart gun purchases,
consumer demand for the guns may increase.168
Furthermore, critics’ claims about the lack of market demand for
smart guns may be overstated. For instance, a 2015 study revealed that
164
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forty-three percent of gun owners—around twenty-four million people—
would be willing to buy a childproof personalized gun,169 and a 2016
survey revealed that sixty percent of Americans purchasing a new firearm
would be interested in buying smart guns.170 Thus, not only is there a high
interest in smart guns, but the interest is increasing overtime.
The backlash from gun rights advocacy groups like the National
Rifle Association (“NRA”) has been a significant hurdle to the innovation,
legislation, and sale of smart guns.171 For example, the NRA led boycotts
against a gun manufacturer after the company agreed to dedicate some of
its resources to developing personalized smart guns as a condition of
settled litigation.172 In addition to protesting manufacturers, gun rights
advocates have also fervently opposed the retailers that sell smart guns.173
After a gun store owner decided to sell Armatix’s smart guns at his store
in Maryland, he received death threats and degrading messages from those
who opposed the technology.174
A possible way to reduce this backlash would be to introduce
smart guns through law enforcement and military use. If smart guns were
used by law enforcement and the military, consumers would be more
likely to deem them reliable.175 Additionally, encouraging law
enforcement and the military to consider smart guns would both increase
research and development in the technology and foster civilian consumer
appeal.176 In sum, military and law enforcement use of smart guns would
popularize them through a top-down approach, reducing the costs,
spurring innovation, and signaling to consumers that smart guns are more
reliable than the critics claim.
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Finally, prior legislative mishaps concerning smart guns are
hurdles to potential smart gun mandates and even to the sale of smart
guns.177 For instance, New Jersey’s infamous 2002 smart gun law required
“all handguns sold within the state to be personalized within two to three
years after a qualifying personalized handgun is available for sale
anywhere in the country.”178 While the goal of the law was to incentivize
smart gun development by ensuring that there would be a market for smart
guns, the law had serious unintended consequences.179 Gun rights activists
deemed the New Jersey law too extreme, which played a large role in the
mandate’s ultimate failure.180 Because gun rights activists were
unsuccessful in opposing the New Jersey law, they instead proceeded to
impede its implementation by boycotting gun manufacturers and retailers
who expressed interest in the technology.181 Their efforts were largely
successful, as there are only a few smart guns currently available on the
market.182
A potential solution to smart gun backlash is to pass incremental
smart gun legislation. While a mandate restricting the sale of guns to smart
guns will be opposed by gun rights advocacy groups, a law encouraging
the sale of both smart guns and traditional guns could help close the gap
between the two extremes. New Jersey has tried to fix its fatal mistake
through a recent amendment to the law: instead of requiring that smart gun
technology be incorporated into all new handguns once the technology is
approved, the amended law now requires firearm retailers to have at least
one personalized handgun for sale within 60 days of the smart gun’s
approval.183 This legislation is less intrusive than the previous mandate,

177

See GIFFORDS LAW CTR., supra note 2, at 62 (noting issues with the New Jersey
Mandate).
178
Id.
179
See Stevenson, supra note 3, at 701 (stating that “making rules and giving
grants . . . [can] foster . . . widespread adoption by consumers.”); Metzler, supra
note 27, at 117–18 (describing the challenges with smart gun laws in Maryland,
New Jersey, and Massachusetts).
180
See Stevenson, supra note 3, at 706 (highlighting that “[c]ritcs, such as the
National Rifle Association [], argued that such legislation would effectively be a
handgun ban, which would implicate Second Amendment rights. Even today,
smart gun advocates consider the New Jersey bill ‘a debilitating blow for the smart
gun movement’ because it virtually halted all development in smart technology in
the U.S.”).
181
GIFFORDS LAW CTR., supra note 2, at 62.
182
See id. at 53–57 (describing five available smart gun technologies).
183
Giffords Law Ctr. to Prevent Gun Violence, Smart Guns in New Jersey,
GIFFORDS.ORG (May 19, 2021), https://lawcenter.giffords.org/smart-guns-innew-jersey/.

No. 1]

DUKE LAW & TECHNOLOGY REVIEW

225

thus avoiding the harsh response from gun advocacy groups while still
making smart guns more prevalent in the market.
Just because a smart gun mandate is likely to be constitutional
does not mean that it should be implemented in full force right away.
Enacting incremental legislation may be a more efficient way to achieve
the same goal. If firearm retailers sell both smart guns and traditional
firearms, smart guns are likely to be less taboo, and consumers could
realize the potential benefits of smart guns on their own, thus reducing the
seemingly insurmountable backlash from gun rights advocates.
Another potential legislative solution would be for a state
legislature to enact a smart gun mandate that only goes into effect after a
certain percentage of the police force in the state has adopted smart guns.
This would be an objective and hopefully apolitical metric to determine
smart guns’ reliability and would likely mitigate backlash to a smart gun
mandate because a community would trust that its police force’s choice in
weaponry is reliable.

CONCLUSION
While smart guns are likely constitutional and would reduce
certain types of firearm-related deaths, the practical roadblocks to
implementation are significant. Given that external biometric trigger lock
devices are reasonably priced and are currently the most reliable smart gun
technology available, they are the most realistic avenue for
implementation through legislation. Additionally, while the technology
already exists, more research is needed by independent institutions to
determine whether smart gun manufacturers’ claims of reliability are
accurate. Finally, the key stakeholders in the firearm industry should look
to other industries for guidance. For example, the automotive and
pharmaceutical industries both researched and adopted life-saving
technological modifications to their products that were deemed expensive
and burdensome at the time but have proven to be valuable.184 While the
smart gun issues discussed in this Note raise more questions than answers,
some points are certain: an effective approach to reducing firearm-related
deaths should focus on researching and investing in technology and
emphasize evidence-based solutions.
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